ABSTRACT A number of philosophers have argued that alcoholics should receive lower priority for liver transplantations because they are morally responsible for their medical conditions. In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is false. Moral responsibility should not be used as a criterion for the allocation of medical resources. The reason I advance goes further than the technical problem of assessing moral responsibility. The deeper problem is that using moral responsibility as an allocation criterion undermines the functioning of medicine.

In recent times Wittgenstein's work in logic has had an influence on other branches of philosophy. I am thinking, in particular, of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion. In these branches, Wittgenstein's followers have made much use of his notion of a language game. It has been argued, for example, that religion forms a language game of its own, having its own standards of reason, and is therefore not subject to criticism from outside. This argument has given rise to (...) controversy, some seeing it as a subtle attempt by the religious to evade criticism. I have come myself to feel that the notion of a language game has been put to uses with which Wittgenstein himself might not have agreed, or, if he had, would have been wrong to do so. In order to explain what I mean I should like to look closely at the opening section of Peter Winch's article ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’. (shrink)

When scientists consider the interaction of science and value judgments, debates often occur. When public policy grows out of science, disagreements between scientists can become even more spirited. This paper examines the case of nutrition policy in the United States, which has been both at the interface between agriculture and medicine and the object of serious discord concerned with the strength and validity of the scientific evidence and the responsibility for action. The development of indirect intervention policies, designed to educate (...) and inform the public on diet and health, is traced as a practical demonstration of the effects of involvements of nutritional scientists of different disciplines and philosophic bents. Controversies centered mainly on the issues of diet and coronary heart disease and of diet and cancer in nutritional guidelines for Americans and the recommended dietary allowances. But the arguments turned on a complex web of values and interests as well as scientific questions. A remarkable turnaround by animal agriculture and its scientific support occurred, changing from a defensive, rightist stance to one that appears to recognize a moral responsibility to the public health. The convincing point was likely the changing market. Nutritional scientists, however, remained divided on the issue of whether a public health strategy keyed to public education should replace a strategy to identify persons of high risk and modify the risk by treatment. Our analysis suggests that the tension between libertarian and utilitarian social values of scientists is at least as important as disagreements relative to validity and strengths of the scientific evidence. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In 1954 F. R. Leavis wrote to the Times Literary Supplement taking issue with one of its reviewers. The reviewer had contrasted Leavis's approach to Shakespeare with that of Empson and Bradley. The latter, the reviewer had said, ‘like the plain man, or the audience in a theatre, cannot help considering the situation [in one of Shakespeare's plays] as “actual” and the characters as “real”’. Leavis, the reviewer had implied, treats the situation and characters somewhat differently.

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 1, Page 53-57, January 2022.

Rhees seems unaware that Simone Weil differed from him both in her conception of philosophy and of its relation to religion. She differed also in her view of the relation between religion and science. On her view, the aim of science is to find the laws which will allow us to apply deductive reasoning to nature. The necessities revealed had for her a religious significance. But this can be understood only given her view of the relation between God and the (...) world. On her view, the creation of the world did not involve an extension of God's power. It involved a withdrawal of his power, so that there could be an existence independent of himself. God does not interfere in the details of the world but sustains it through a network of necessities. For this reason, these necessities can serve as a sign of God. (shrink)

I argue that while there is no evidence that Roy Holland was influenced by Henri Bergson, their views of morality nevertheless reveal an interesting similarity.

This title was first published in 2001: Tolstoy's view of art is discussed in most courses in aesthetics, particularly his main text What is Art? He believed that the importance of art lies not in its purely aesthetic qualities but in its connection with life, and that art becomes decadent where this connection is lost. This view has often been misconceived and its strength overlooked. This book presents a clear exposition of Tolstoy's What is Art?, highlighting the value and importance (...) of Tolstoy's views in relation to aesthetics. Mounce considers the problems which exercised Tolstoy and explains their fundamental importance in contemporary disputes. Having viewed these problems of aesthetics as they arise in a classic work, Howard Mounce affords readers fresh insights not simply into the problems of aesthetics themselves, but also into their contemporary treatment. Students and interested readers of aesthetics and philosophy, as well as those exploring the works of Tolstoy in literature, will find this book of particular interest and will discover that reading What is Art? with attention, affords something of the excitement found in removing the grime from an oil painting - gradually from underneath there appears an authentic masterpiece. (shrink)

Metaphysics -- Bacon -- Locke -- Kant -- Comte -- Logical positivism -- Russell -- Analysis -- Quine and science -- Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time (...) but not in logic, for non-verbal symbols must have a logical structure in common with verbal ones. A view comparable with Malcolm's holds that Wittgenstein, under the influence of Schopenhauer, is committed to some form of solipsism. I argue that neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein held any version of solipsism. For both philosophers, subject and object are correlative, so that it is incoherent to affirm the existence of the one without presupposing the existence of the other. (shrink)

Nocebo effects occur when an individual experiences undesirable physiological reactions caused by doxastic states that are not a treatment’s core or characteristic features.1 As Scott Gelfand2 points out, there are numerous studies that have shown that the disclosure of a treatment’s side effects to a patient increases the risk of the side effects. From an ethical point of view, nocebo effects caused by the disclosures of side effects present a challenging problem. On the one hand, clinicians’ duty to inform patients (...) of the consequences (including possible side effects) of their treatments is critical in ensuring that patients’ autonomy is respected. Patients cannot act autonomously if relevant information is withheld from them (without their consent, perhaps). On the other hand, clinicians also ought to minimize harm to patients. (shrink)

My title has been taken from the following passage in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:Describe the aroma of coffee—why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking?—But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?.